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Abstract 
We investigated the extent to which activation of specific information in associative 
networks during a memory task could facilitate subsequent analogical problem solving in 
healthy older adults as well as those with early onset Alzheimer’s disease. We also examined 
whether these priming effects were stronger when the activation of the critical solution term 
during the memory task occurred when the item was actually presented (true memories) or 
when this item arose due to spreading activation to a related but nonpresented item (false 
memory). Older adult controls (OACs) and people with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) were 
asked to solve 9 verbal proportional analogies, 3 of which had been primed by 
Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists where the critical lure (and problem solution) was presented 
as a word in the list (true memory), 3 of which were primed by DRM lists whose critical lures 
were spontaneously activated during list presentation (false memory), and 3 of which were 
unprimed. As expected, OACs were better (both in terms of speed and accuracy) at solving 
problems than people with AD and both groups were better when false memories were 
primes than when true memories were primes or there were no primes. There were no reliable 
differences between unprimed and true prime problems. These findings demonstrate that (a) 
priming of problem solutions extends to verbal proportional analogies in OACs and people 
with AD, (b) false memories are more effective at priming problem solutions than true 
memories, and (c) there are clear positive consequences to the production of false memories. 
 
Keywords: Alzheimer’s disease, analogical reasoning, DRM paradigm, false memory, 
priming problem solving  
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Introduction 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) has been described as a progressive neurodegenerative 
disorder where learning and memory performance has been reduced, as well as rapid 
forgetting of new information (Malone, Deason, Plumbo, Heyworth, Tat, & Budson, 2018). 
As well as memory loss, patients with AD also have a higher rate of memory distortions and 
false memories, in which patients remember an incorrect memory that is believed to be true. 
For example, people with AD may have thought that they had turned off their stove when 
they simply misremembered that they turned off the stove.  
The DRM paradigm has become an essential procedure used to study false memories 
(e.g., Akhtar, Howe, & Hopestine, in press; Gilet, Everard, Colombel, et al., 2017). Typically, 
the memory task consists of a study phase during which participants are presented with lists 
of associatively related words (e.g., vehicle, keys, ford, road) that are also strongly associated 
with a critical lure (CL) that is never presented (i.e., car), followed by a free recall or 
recognition task. The typical result is that participants falsely remember the CL at a rate 
commensurate with that for memory for the actually presented items. 
 In healthy participants, results robustly show a strong tendency to recall and recognize 
the CLs falsely, thus creating false memories (e.g., Akhtar et al., in press; Balota, Watson, 
Duchek, & Ferraro, 1999; Deese, 1959; McDermott, 1996). Research using the DRM 
paradigm in healthy older adults regularly shows an increase in false recall and recognition of 
CLs relative to healthy younger adults (e.g., Balota et al., 1999; Dehon & Bredart, 2004: 
Dennis, Kim, & Cabeza, 2007; but see McCabe & Smith, 2002 and Thomas & Sommers, 
2005, for contradictory results). Several studies have used the DRM paradigm in people with 
AD (see Akhtar et al., in press). Whilst some studies have shown that AD people recall more 
CLs thus producing more false memories than healthy older adults (e.g., Devitt & Schacter 
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2016; Watson, Balota, & Sergent-Marshall, 2001). Several other studies have found 
contrasting results, thus showing that AD patients produce or recognize fewer or as many 
CLs as older healthy participants (Akhtar et al., in press; Balota et al., 1999; Budson et al., 
2002; Gallo 2006; Waldie & Kwong See, 2003). Although this discrepancy exists in the 
literature, in the present study we were not concerned with examining this directly. We are 
interested in whether false memories can be elicited in OACs and people with AD, and if so 
whether they can be useful in a subsequent task (e.g. Akhtar et al., in press) as they are in 
children (Howe et al., 2011, 2013, 2016). 
A number of theories have been proposed to explain how false memories are formed. 
The activation-monitoring theory (see Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001) is 
considered the more dominant theory (see Gallo 2010 for a review). The theory proposes 
false memories are produced because of two distinct processes; an activation process and a 
source-monitoring process. If we consider the DRM task, because the presentation of each of 
the lists of words automatically activates the related but unpresented CL, the CL is activated 
many times through an automatic spread of activation within the associative network. It’s this 
activation that increases the feeling of familiarity for the item, while at the same time 
reducing the ability to remember the source of its activation (source-monitoring process). 
Thus, according to this theory, in order for OACs and people with AD to form false 
memories, they must have intact associative networks. 
More generally, false memories have traditionally been viewed as negative, 
particularly in aging adults (e.g., Devit & Schacter, 2016; Malone et al., 2018). However, 
recent research has demonstrated that the production of false memories need not always have 
negative implications (Akhtar et al., in press; Howe, 2011; Howe, Garner, Dewhurst, & Ball, 
2010; Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011; Howe, Threadgold, Wilkinson, Garner, 
& Ball, 2017). Akhtar et al. (in press) were the first to carry out research investigating the 
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role that false memories play in priming insight-based problem solving using compound 
remote associate tasks (CRATs) (see Mednick, 1962) in OACs and people with AD. CRAT 
problems, originally developed by Mednick (1962), involve the presentation of three words 
(e.g., pal, tip, and knife) and the task is to come up with a word (i.e., pen) which, when 
combined with each of the three original words, creates compound words or common phrases 
(i.e., pen pal, pen tip, pen knife). Akhtar et al. (in press) presented OACs and people with AD 
with DRM lists whose critical lures served as potential primes for half of the subsequent 
CRAT problems that participants had to solve. They found that when participants falsely 
remembered the CLs of the studied DRM lists, the corresponding CRATs were solved more 
frequently and significantly faster than CRATs that had not been primed or cases in which 
DRM lists had been presented but CLs were not falsely remembered. Howe et al. (2010, 
2011) showed similar findings in young adults and children. This research demonstrates that 
like true memories, false memories can successfully prime higher order cognitive tasks (i.e., 
insight-based problem solving). 
The aim of the current research was to establish whether priming with false memories 
could also be applied to more complex reasoning tasks that go beyond “simple” word 
associations. To this end, we selected verbal proportional analogies of the type ‘a is to b as c 
is to d’ (e.g., ring is to finger as bracelet is to wrist).  In analogical reasoning tasks, 
participants are usually presented with ‘a is to b as c is to ?’ and are expected to generate the 
d term. These types of analogies are frequently used in intelligence tests (Stenberg, 1977) and 
academic examinations such as statutory assessment tests. Importantly, Howe, Threadgold, 
Norbury, Garner, and Ball (2013) showed that false memories can prime analogical problem 
solving in both child and young adult populations (also see Howe, Garner, Threadgold, & 
Ball, 2015).  
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We were also interested in whether true and false memory priming both enhance the 
speed and accuracy of analogical reasoning in OACs and people with early onset AD when 
problem difficulty is equated across groups. We know from Akhtar et al. (in press) that 
people with AD produce false memories that they can subsequently use in a positive way to 
help solve insight-based problems. Here, we extend these findings in two ways. First, we 
examined whether OACs and people with AD have intact associative networks that lead to 
the activation of false memories that can be used to prime analogical problem solving. Recent 
research (e.g., Akhtar et al., in press; Evrard, Colombel, Gilet, & Corson, 2016; Gilet et al., 
2017; Roediger et al., 2001) has shown both older adults and people with AD do have intact 
associative networks that lead to the activation of false memories. Second, we examined 
whether OACs and people with AD can use not only false memories as primes when solving 
analogies but also true (actually presented words) memories as effective primes when solving 
analogies. 
 
Experiment 1: Norming Verbal Analogies 
Norms for the relative difficulty of various analogical reasoning problems have been 
produced using either children or young adults as participants. In order determine the relative 
difficulty of analogical reasoning problems for older adults, we first had to create our own 
age-appropriate norms for older adults.  We did this by having an independent sample of 
older adults solve various analogies and then selected ones whose baseline solution rates 
were moderate (30% to 80%; see Appendix) for older adults for use in our second 
experiment.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 45 healthy older adults (10 males and 35 females) took part in this 
experiment. Their mean age was 74.77 (SD = 5.56). The older adults had normal cognitive 
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functioning (as assessed by the Mini Mental State Examination, MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & 
McHugh, 1974) with a mean score of 28.39 (SD = 1.01), normal activities of daily living, and 
most importantly, did not meet diagnostic criteria for dementia. These older adults were 
volunteers who were community dwelling and were tested in their own home or local 
community centre.  
Materials. Older adults were presented with, in randomized order, 20 analogical problems. 
The format of the problems was ‘a is to b as c is to ?’ Participants were instructed to provide 
one response and had a maximum time of 60 seconds after which the next analogical problem 
appeared on the screen. If participant could not think of a response, they were instructed to 
click next. (Note that only problems with solution rates above 30% and solved within 30 
seconds were selected for subsequent use in Experiment 2.) All the solution words had a 
familiarity rating of 500 or above (with a maximum entry of 645 and a mean of 566 
(Coltheart, 1981)) and a word frequency of 10 or above (with a maximum entry of 686 and a 
mean of 126 (Kucera & Francis, 1967)). 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. Instructions similar to those 
used by Howe et al. (2013) were given. Specifically, participants were told that they will be 
presented with a word analogy (e.g., hat is to head as sock is to _____) and are advised to 
attempt to solve the analogy (i.e., foot). Participants were first given three demonstrations by 
the experimenter followed by two practice problems prior to the experiment itself. The 
analogical problems were presented on a computer laptop screen simultaneously in a 
horizontal orientation. Participants were given 30s to produce the solution (this was a verbal 
solution) and their first response was recorded. If the solution was produced within the time 
limit, both the solution word and solution time were recorded and the next problem was 
presented. If participants did not produce the correct response within the time limit, the 
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solution was provided by the experimenter and the program automatically moved to the next 
problem. 
 
 
Results 
Table 1 shows the average solution rates and times to the 20 problems separately. As can be 
seen, older adults were able to solve most of the analogical problems. Importantly, for the 
next experiment, there was a good range of solution rates and times to the analogical 
problems. What this means is that priming effects, should they exist, can be measured 
without constraints imposed by floor and ceiling effects.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Experiment 2: Examining Priming Effects in Older Healthy Adults and those with AD 
With these norms in hand, we now turn to the main questions. That is, can both true and false 
memories prime solutions to analogical problems in healthy older adults and people with AD. 
 
Method 
Participants. A new sample of 60 participants was recruited whose demographic and other 
characteristics are shown in Table 2. Thirty participants had a clinical diagnosis of probable 
or possible AD (McKhann, Drachman, Folstein, Katzman, Price, & Stadlan 1984). Thirty 
participants made up an older adult control (OAC) group. These people were community 
dwelling and were recruited from a panel of older adults who had expressed an interest in 
participating in research. Nine participants were excluded from analysis due to Mini-Mental 
Status Exam (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) scores indicated moderate AD rather than 
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early AD (< 20; Rosa, Deason, Budson & Gutchess, 2014). Six controls were also excluded 
from analysis due to age (<60 years, and thus not aged matched), leaving 24 OACs (8 males 
and 16 females) and 21 early onset AD (5 males and 16 females) participants. Older healthy 
adults gave their written informed consent. For people with AD, written informed consent 
was given either by them or their primary caregivers. 
 There were no significant differences between OAC’s and AD participants on age and 
years of education, but the groups differed on most cognitive tests (see Table 2). 
Design  
A 2 (Group: AD or OAC) x 3 (Priming: true memory prime, false memory prime, or 
unprimed) mixed design was employed. Group was a between-participants factor, and 
priming of solution was a within-participant factor. Primed problems were analysed for those 
participants who either correctly recalled the presented critical lure (true memory priming) or 
falsely recalled the critical lure (false memory priming) or when the solution was unprimed. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Materials and procedure. We followed the same procedure as Howe et al., (2013), see figure 
1.. There were nine DRM lists selected to use in this experiment selected from Roediger, 
Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). Each DRM list consisted of 12 words (e.g., shoe, hand, 
toe, walk) and was associated with an unpresented target or ‘critical lure’ item (e.g., foot). 
The lists for false memory primes contained 12 associates of the unpresented critical lure. 
Lists for true memory primes (words actually presented) contained 11 of these associates, 
with the lowest associate being replaced with the critical lure to that list in the first 
presentation position (see Howe et al., 2013). The first serial position was chosen for the 
critical lure to ensure that this term was “other” – generated rather than “self”-generated. That 
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is, the processing of prior related items before presentation of the critical lure could cause 
activation of the critical lure before it was actually presented, a situation that would lead to it 
being self-generated rather than other-generated. By using the first serial position in the DRM 
list, we ensured that in our true memory priming condition the critical lure was self-generated 
by the participant. The final item of the list was removed in the true memory condition in 
order to ensure that the overall backward associative strength (BAS; a key factor in 
determining the probability of producing false memories) of the list did not vary greatly 
between the true and false memory priming conditions. Associative words that overlapped 
with the items presented in the analogical problems were removed and replaced with another 
associate. In this way, DRM list items were not part of any subsequent analogy items (see 
Appendix). The Experiment had 3 stages: study phase, recognition test, and analogy problem 
task. 
 Study phase. Participants were tested individually and were first presented with six 
of the nine DRM lists in randomized order. Three of the lists contained the true memory 
prime to three of the subsequently presented analogies (i.e., the first presented item in the list 
was the critical lure/analogy solution) and three of the lists did not contain the critical lure to 
three of the subsequently presented analogies (i.e., the critical lure/analogy solution would be 
the associated but unpresented critical lure to each of the three lists). Each list was presented 
verbally by the experimenter and was followed by a brief distractor task (counting backwards 
by three’s). Following this, the next list was presented and this sequence of study-distractor 
continued until all six lists were completed.  
Recognition test. Once participants had completed all six DRM lists, they completed 
a recognition task whereby participants were verbally presented with the 6 critical lure words 
(3 true and 3 false words) from the studied DRM lists, 6 unstudied and unrelated critical lure 
words (these were critical lures taken from unrelated and non-presented DRM lists), 32 list 
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items (these were studied words from the presented DRM lists), 32 unrelated words (these 
were words taken from unrelated and non-presented DRM lists; unrelated foils), and 6 related 
but unpresented items (these were weakly related words that were from the presented DRM 
lists but that had not been presented during study; weakly-related foils). All items in the 
recognition test were taken from Roediger et al. (2001). A recognition test was implemented 
rather than a recall test to reduce effects of priming during retrieval (Olszewska & 
Ulatowska, 2013). For each word presented in the recognition task, participants had to select 
either [O], indicating that the word was Old and that they recognize the word from the 
previously presented lists, or [N] if they thought the current word presented was a new word 
that they did not hear in the previous word lists.  
Analogy problems task. Finally, participants solved a practice analogical reasoning 
problem before completing nine test analogical reasoning problems (using the same 
procedure as Experiment 1). Participants were presented with, in a randomized order, the nine 
analogical reasoning problems in the format of ‘a is to b as c is to ?’ For example, the 
analogy for the critical lure ‘foot’ was ‘hat is to head as sock is to _____.’ Participants 
provided their answers verbally to the experimenter. The time taken for them to complete the 
analogical problem, from presentation of the analogical problem to production of the 
response was recorded. The experimenter was blind to which analogies corresponded to 
which priming condition participants were in, with the experimenter not knowing which 
analogies were primed with a true memory or which analogies were primed with a false 
memory. Similarly, the experimenter was blind to whether participants recalled the critical 
lure or not until after completion of the study. Participants were given a maximum of 60 s to 
provide an answer. Presentation of the DRM lists according to their link to the solution type 
in the unprimed, true memory prime, and false memory prime conditions was fully 
counterbalanced such that each DRM list and associated analogical problem appeared equally 
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often across participants within each group in each solution-type condition. A diagram of the 
entire procedure is depicted in Figure 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results 
Recognition task 
The recognition task showed that both the OACs and people with AD created false 
memories for the critical lure words, with people with AD falsely recognizing the critical lure 
63% (M = 1.91, SD = 0.67) of the time and the OAC group 61% (M = 1.85, SD = .81) of the 
time. There were no reliable group differences (t ns).  
Overall recognition scores were analyzed using a 2 (Group: AD vs. OAC) x 4 (list 
type: critical lures, unstudied unrelated critical lures, foils, and list items) mixed model 
ANOVA. Analysis revealed a significant main effect of list type, F(1, 44) = 492.19, p < .001. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed greater recognition for list items (78.8%) compared to foil 
items [correctly identifying these as ‘New’ items, (70.5%) (M = 25.21, SD = 3.16 vs M = 
22.58, SD = 6.115)] and greater recognition of CL words (73.6%) compared to unrelated CL 
words (44.5%) (M = 4.42, SD = 1.18 vs M = 2.67, SD = 1.22). There was a main effect of 
group F(1, 44) = 18.76, p < .001. To investigate this further we ran separate t-tests on list 
types; for list items the OAC group recognised significantly more items (M = 26.61, SD = 
2.27) than people with AD (M = 23.6, SD = 3.31)  t (44) = 3.5, p<.001. Concerning Foil items 
again the OAC group recognised significantly more items (M = 24.48, SD = 6.62) than 
people with AD (M = 20.4, SD = 4.74), t (44) = 2.28, p<.05. There were no reliable group 
differences for critical lures and unrelated critical lures t (44) = 1.18, P>0.05. 
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Signal detection measures 
Because false alarm rates for recognition tests often require a correction for response 
bias, we analyzed discrimination and response bias scores using signal detection analysis. We 
used the Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) correction for signal theory (SDT), whereby 0.5 was 
added to hit and false alarm rates and the corrected score was divided by N + 1. This was 
used in order to prevent values of 1.0 and 0. For discriminability (d’), larger values indicate 
better memory performance, and for criterion value C, values greater than 0 represent a 
conservative bias and less than 0 represents a liberal bias. The calculation of d’ and C for 
critical lures and hits used the common false alarm rate for unrelated critical lure. 
The values of d’ and C are shown in Table 3. Signal detection measures for hits and 
critical lures were analysed in separate 2 (Group: AD vs OAC) X 2 (list type: critical lures vs 
studied items) mixed-model ANOVA. The analysis of d’ revealed a main effect of list type, 
where by discriminability was better for critical lures compared to list items, F(1, 44) = 
46.67, p < .001, η²p = .17. There was no main effect of group and no interaction (p ns).  
Analysis of the criterion C revealed a more liberal bias for the critical lures F(1, 44) = 
8.301, p < .001, η²p = .53 compared to studied items. There was a main effect of group F(1, 
44) = 26.53, p < .001, η²p = .39 whereby people with AD revealed a more liberal bias 
compared to OACs. There was no significant interaction. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The mean analogy solution rates (proportions) and the mean analogy solution times 
(in seconds) were calculated for each participant and analyzed separately in a series of 2 
(Group: OAC vs. AD) x 5 (Priming: primed/FM vs. primed/no-FM vs. primed/TM vs. 
primed/no-TM vs. unprimed) ANOVAs. Note that these problem solving data are 
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conditionalized on memory performance. That is, primed/FM refers to analogy problems that 
were solved correctly only when the related false memory was recognized on the memory test 
and primed/no-FM refers to problems solved when the DRM list was presented but the 
participant did not falsely remember the critical lure on the recognition test.  Primed/TM 
refers to analogy problems that were solved correctly only when the true memory was 
recognized on the memory test and primed/no-TM refers to problems solved when the DRM 
list was presented but the participant did not remember the actually presented critical lure on 
the recognition test.  Of course, unprimed refers to analogy problems that were solved 
correctly when no DRM priming list was presented. 
Analogy Solution Rates 
 Concerning solution rates, there was a main effect for priming, F(4, 44) = 48.02, 
p < .001, η²p = .32, where post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) showed that solution rates were 
higher for primed/FM analogical problems (M = 2.83) than for primed/no-FM (M = 1.96, p = 
<.01), primed/TM (M = 1.93, p = < .01), primed/no-TM (M = 1.83, p = < .01)  and when 
participants were unprimed (M = 1.90, p = < .01), with the latter 4 conditions not differing. 
As expected, there was a main effect of group, F(1, 44) = 8.16, p < .001, η²p = .24, where 
post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) showed the OACs solved reliably more problems compared to 
people with AD (see Table 4). There was no significant interaction. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Analogy Solution Times 
 As anticipated, there were significant differences in solution times as a function 
of group and priming. Specifically there was a main effect for priming, F(4, 44) = 103.28, p < 
.001, η²p = .544, where post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) showed that solution times were faster 
for primed/FM problems (M = 3.52 sec) compared to primed/No-FM problems (M = 5.49, p 
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< .01), primed/TM problems (M = 5.33 sec,  p < .01), primed/no-TM problems (M = 5.56 sec,  
p < .01), and unprimed analogical problems (M = 5.59 sec, p = < .01), with the latter 4 
conditions not differing. There was a main effect of group, F(1, 44) =  79.51, p < .001, η²p = 
.694, where post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) showed OAC’s solution times were faster (M = 
4.01 sec) compared to people with AD (M = 5.77 sec, p < .01), (see Table 4). The interaction 
was not significant. 
 
General Discussion 
 The present study set out to extend the positive consequences of false memories 
using verbal proportional analogies, in healthy older adults and people with Alzheimer’s 
disease. Although this effect has been shown in CRAT problems in OACs and people with 
AD (Akhtar et al., in press), it is not clear whether such effects extend to problem-solving 
tasks that are more complex. Nor is it clear whether false memories serve as better primes for 
problem solving than true memories. To investigate these issues, participants were asked to 
solve verbal proportional analogies, three of which had been primed by a true memory, three 
of which were primed by a false memory, and three of which were unprimed. Our findings 
provide a unique and important demonstration that false memories are more effective at 
priming solutions to analogical problems than true memories for OACs and people with AD. 
 An important aim of the current study was to ascertain whether both true and 
false memory priming could facilitate speed and accuracy of analogical reasoning for both 
OACs and people with AD. In order to examine this, we needed to show that participants 
form false memories for DRM lists and that they can remember items that were actually 
presented. Consistent with previous research, our study showed no reliable differences in the 
number of false memories produced in the recognition task for OACs and people with AD 
(Akhtar et al., in press; Roediger et al., 2001; Waldie & Kwong-See, 2003). This finding can 
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be explained by the fact that both older healthy adults and those with AD show intact 
semantic networks that automatically activate CLs upon DRM list presentation (Akhtar et al., 
in press; Evrard et al., 2016; Gilet et al., 2017). Both older healthy adults and those with AD 
have intact semantic networks that automatically activate CLs upon DRM list presentation. 
Our findings support existing evidence regarding the underlying mechanisms in the 
production of false memories (Evrard et al., 2016; Gilet et al., 2017; Roediger et al., 2001).  
Previous research has shown the generation of false memories from the automatic spread of 
activation within the semantic networks and the corresponding activations of word 
associations. The findings from the present study further extend this notion, providing 
evidence that not only are false memories associated with the spreading activation among 
semantic associates but that they can exert a positive effect when it comes to priming 
subsequent task performance (McDermott, 1997). Importantly, when a recognition test is 
administered in this priming paradigm, endorsement of the false memory item vs. no 
endorsement is an index of the strength of activation of the critical lure in memory. That is, 
no recognition means that activation is below threshold whereas recognition indicates that 
this activation is above threshold. Although false memories arise at encoding, test 
performance reveals the strength of that activation. It also turns out that presenting the critical 
lure at test has little or no effect on memory strength of the critical lure because, as already 
mentioned, false memories arise during the encoding, not retrieval, processing (see Howe, 
Wilkinson, Garner, & Ball, 2016).  
It is important to acknowledge, that despite these findings, there exists a large clinical 
literature showing that there are important semantic deficits associated with Alzheimer’s 
disease and people with MCI (e.g., Hodges, Salmon, & Butters, 1992; Howard & Patterson, 
1992). However, despite these deficits, Nebes (1989) and Evard et al. (2015) have shown that 
semantic priming in Alzheimer’s disease has remained relatively intact. Thus, like these latter 
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priming results, our experiments show that when it comes to tasks in which simple, semantic 
associative processes are engaged automatically, the results of these processes can be used to 
facilitate subsequent problem solving. 
 Just like in Akhtar et al. (in press) and Howe et al. (2011), we found that when 
problem solutions were primed by the prior presentation of DRM lists whose critical lures 
were falsely remembered and were solutions to those problems, both the probability of such 
problems being solved and the speed with which they were solved improved significantly for 
both OACs and people with AD. Thus, DRM lists can prime and facilitate performance on 
problem-solving tasks both in terms of the rate and the speed which they are solved. Such 
facilitation was not found when the CL (false memory) was not remembered. Moreover, 
priming with true memories resulted in problem-solving rates and times identical to 
conditions in which there was no priming. This further strengthens the notion that false 
memories are superior primes to true memories and can successfully prime higher cognitive 
processes (analogical reasoning). Overall then, false memories can have very positive effects 
on subsequent cognitive tasks at least in terms of problems involving proportional analogies 
and insight-based solutions, across the lifespan and with people who have AD (Akhtar et al., 
in press; Diliberto-Macaluso, 2005; Howe et al., 2010, 2011, 2016).   
 To summarize, regardless of cognitive abilities, speed and solution rates of 
problem solving were affected by priming – specifically false memory primes. Despite 
people with AD being slower than the OACs to solve problems (main effect of group), 
solution rates were reliably higher and solution times were reliably quicker, and by the same 
magnitude, for both groups for problems that were primed by false memories. No advantage 
was obtained for priming true memories. This finding has implications not only for priming 
work but also for the debate surrounding the differences between, and similarities of, true and 
false memories (e.g., Diliberto-Macaluso, 2005; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In terms of 
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priming higher-order reasoning tasks, there appears to be a clear distinction between true and 
false remembering. Importantly, this provides further evidence for the beneficial effects of 
false memories in a problem-solving domain. 
 The fact that only false memory primes were effective in speeding up analogical 
problem solving has been documented in children and young adults (Howe et al., 2013). One 
explanation for this advantage relates to the literature concerning the superiority of self-
generated information (e.g., spontaneous false memories) over other-generated information 
(e.g., experimenter presented true memories) that is seen more generally in memory (e.g., 
Howe et al., 2013). Self-generated information is better retained than other-generated 
information in both groups in the present study and has been well documented in young 
adults (e.g., Howe et al., 2013; Mulligan & Lozito, 2004) and children (Howe et al., 2013). If 
critical lures from DRM lists are not explicitly presented as part of the list (as they were in 
the true memory condition), then when they are falsely remembered, they can be considered 
to be self-generated information. In contrast to conditions where information is already on the 
list, or other-generated information, this self-generated information tends to be stronger and 
more durable in memory. Howe et al. (2013) proposed that false memories are stronger than 
true memories just like self-generated memories may be expected to have a greater effect on 
the speed of problem solving over true or other-generated memories when used as primes.  
 This explanation has considerable currency in the child development literature 
and given the current results, may hold across the lifespan and for people with AD. Indeed, it 
would seem that one could propose that the mnemonic benefits of self-referencing and self-
generation that are seen in children (e.g., Cunningham, Brebner, Quinn, & Turk, 2014; Ford 
& Lobao, 2018), young adults (e.g., Mulligan & Lozito, 2004), older adults (for a review, see 
Gutchess & Kensinger, 2018), and should also extend to older adults with AD (at least in the 
early stages). In fact, there is some data indicating that self-referencing can play an important 
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role in memory for healthy older adults and those with AD (Klein, Cosmides, & Costabile 
(2003; Rosa, Deason, Budson, & Gutchess, 2015). This is probably not too surprising 
inasmuch as some theorists (e.g., Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015) view the 
self as the very “glue” that binds encoded elements together to create strong and durable 
traces, ones that are particularly well remembered, and that can be used to benefit other 
perceptual and cognitive processes. Although additional research on the role of the self in 
memory with aging populations is surely needed, this idea serves these current data well and 
knits together our findings with those from the child and young adult literatures. 
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Table 1 Analogical Problems: Solution Rates and Times 
Analogy Problem Analogy Solution % Solved Solution 
Time (s) 
water is to boat as road is to ? Car 80.00 3.75 (1.48) 
moon is to night as sun is to ? day 97.14 4.25 (2.32) 
hat is to head as sock is to ? foot 100.00 3.75 (1.46) 
rock is to hard as pillow is to ? soft 91.40 4.04 (1.88) 
hare is to fast as tortoise is to ? slow 91.40 5.16 (3.35) 
stand is to floor as sit is to ? chair 74.20 9.97 (6.06) 
tooth is to brush as hair is to ? wash 65.70 4.23 (1.87) 
desert is to hot as arctic is to ? cold 80.01 4.07 (1.76) 
eyes is to see as nose is to ? smell 97.14 3.98 (3.53) 
pestle is to mortar as saucer is to ? cup 78.57 7.76 (2.68) 
school is to teacher as hospital is to ? doctor 54.28 5.06 (3.42) 
aunt is to uncle as queen is to ? king 88.57 6.05 (2.53) 
book is to read as thread is to ? sewing 79.57 4.7 (4.16) 
wardrobe is to clothes as bed is to ? sleep 48.22 4.78 (1.71) 
carrot is to vegetable as apple is to ? fruit 91.43 3.82 (9.05) 
poverty is to wealth as sickness is to ? health 62.85 7.18 (4.54) 
dark is to light as short is to ? long 37.10 5.37 (6.17) 
tunnel is to mountain as bridge is to ? river 60.00 7.47 (12.15) 
fire is to hot as candy is to ? sweet 74.29 9.52 (1.19) 
terrified is to scared as mad is to ? anger 30.01 14.49 (18.8) 
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Table 2. Means (and Standard Error) Demographic Characteristics of Participants 
 Early AD OAC Test Statistic P value 
Age 78.25 (1.46) 78.23 (0.81) 2.85 0.35 
Education 13.99 (0.54) 14.01 (0.72) 0.67 0.27 
NART  114.22 (1.8) 117.28 
(0.94) 
2.75 0.15 
MMSE (out of 30) 24.64 (2.7) 29.11 (1.07) 18.17 0.001 
CERAD     
Immediate (out of 30) 11.09 (2.98) 15.44 (4.23) 10.93 0.001 
Delayed (out of 10) 3.15 (1.97) 5.19 (2.32) 12.68 0.001 
Recognition (out of 10) 7.22 (1.82) 9.59 (0.26) 15.19 0.001 
Digit span (out of 10)     
FWD 5.4 (1.0) 6.5 (1.91) 8.72 0.001 
BCK 3.09 (1.1) 5.5  (1.4) 7.83 0.001 
 
Notes. CERAD = Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer ’s disease; Early AD = 
early onset Alzheimer’s Disease; OAC = Older adult controls; MMSE = Mini-Mental State 
Examination 
** Significant p <.001 
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Table 3. Means and Standard deviations of Signal Detection Measures of Discriminability 
(d’) and Bias (C) for Studied Items and Critical Lures (CL). 
 
 OACs  AD  
 d' C d' C 
Studied 0.7 (0.48) 0.93 (0.41) 0.28 (0.6) 0.5 (0.19) 
Lures 0.96 (0.54) 0.29 (0.23) 1.03 (0.11) 0.17 (23.4) 
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Table 4. Mean analogical problem solution rates and solution times for older adults, Early 
Alzheimer’s patients for false memory priming 
Participant   Priming   
 Unprimed Primed/TM Primed/no-
TM 
Primed/FM Primed/no-FM 
      
Solution times (seconds)      
OAC 4.66 (1.92) 4.55 (1.27) 4.65 (0.59) 2.77 (1.65) 4.7 (0.8) 
AD 6.65 (1.57) 6.22 (1.22) 6.47 (1.09) 4.3 (1.74) 6.51 (1.08) 
Solution rates (proportions)     
OAC 0.73 (0.58) 0.71 (0.79) 0.7 (0.83) 1 (.0) 0.69 (0.69) 
AD 0.53 (0.45) 0.56 (0.73) 0.56 (0.65) 0.79 (.31) 0.55 (0.74) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. FM = False Memory 
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Figure 1. Diagram of the Procedure for Experiment 2 (CL = Critical Lures). 
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Appendix. Analogies and DRM lists for Experiment 2. 
Water:Boat::Road:Car 
Car – truck, bus, train, vehicle, drive, jeep, ford, race, keys, garage, highway, van 
Stand:Floor::Sit:Chair 
Chair – table, legs, seat, couch, desk, recliner, sofa, wood, cushion, swivel, stool, sitting 
Tooth:Brush::Hair:Wash 
Wash – rinse, dishes, mouth, scrub, laundry, soap, shampoo, dish, soak, cloth, bathroom 
Desert:Hot::Arctic:Cold 
Cold – snow, warm, winter, ice, wet, frigid, chilly, heat, weather, freeze, air, shiver 
Poverty:Wealth::Sickness:Health 
Health – sickness, good, happiness, ill, service, strong, disease, body, poorly, pain, vigor, 
robust 
Tunnel:Mountain::Bridge:River 
River – water, stream, lake, Mississippi, boat, tide, swim, flow, run, barrage, creek, brook 
Fire:Hot::Candy:Sweet 
Sweet – sour, sugar, bitter, good, taste, tooth, nice, honey, soda, chocolate, heart, cake 
Dark:Light::Short:Long 
Long – tall, narrow, John, time, far, hair, island, road, thin, underwear, distance, line 
Pestle:Mortar::Saucer:Cup 
Cup – mug, tea, measuring, coaster, lid, handle, coffee, straw, goblet, soup, stein, drink 
 
 
 
